Moral Turpitude Is In The Eye Of The Beholder

In contrast to the District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility, the California State Bar Court Review Department holds that an attorney’s four alcohol-related driving offenses involved moral turpitude and warrants a meaningful sanction of actual suspension

 After independently reviewing the record (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.12), we agree with the hearing judge that the facts and circumstances surrounding Guillory’s convictions involve moral turpitude. We base our conclusion on the following facts: (1) Guillory attempted to use his position as an assistant deputy district attorney to avoid arrest; (2) his cousin died in one of his alcohol-related driving incidents; (3) he repeatedly drove with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) well above the legal limit; and (4) he violated his criminal probation by driving on a suspended license at the time of his two most recent arrests for DUI.

 From the start of his career, Guillory has been on notice that the State Bar considers alcohol-related driving convictions to be a serious matter. His first conviction occurred while he was in law school, and it affected his admission to the Bar. He promised the Moral Character Committee (Committee) during the admissions process that he would not drink and drive again. Nevertheless, he did so repeatedly after becoming an attorney, evidencing a lack of concern for public safety and respect for the legal system. Given these circumstances, as well as the serious aggravation (multiple acts and indifference) and lack of mitigation, we affirm the hearing judge’s recommendation of a two-year actual suspension with conditions, including proof of his rehabilitation and fitness to practice law.

The accident that had killed his cousin took place prior to admission and had been disclosed.

He had difficulty acknowledging he was an alcoholic but had some mitigation

As for his personal problems, we accept that Guillory’s emotional and financial difficulties contributed to his alcohol abuse and DUIs. But absent evidence of a sustained commitment to sobriety, he is at risk of committing misconduct if faced with future stressors. (Std. 1.6(d) [must prove that problems no longer pose risk that attorney will commit future misconduct].) Also, the two attorney witnesses who testified to his good character do not represent a wide range of references in the legal and general communities required to demonstrate extraordinary good character.

 Unlike the D.C. case, the offenses were misdemeanors and he did not flee the scene of an accident.

The Review Department nonetheless concludes that a two-year suspension is appropriate.

The Review Department was less sympathetic to the attorney that the D.C. Board had been for  an attorney who seriously injured another motorist and fled the scene.

Unlike in D.C., the regular practice of driving around blind drunk was treated as an aggravating rather than mitigating factor

Guillory claimed that his DUIs caused no harm because they did not result in actual bodily harm or property damage. This attitude shows a lack of insight into the inherent danger in drinking and driving, and the evasive action required by motorists to avoid his reckless driving.

The D.C. BPR apparently shares that lack of insight. (Mike Frisch)