Nearly two years ago, I blogged about a case in which the District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility had granted a hearing on the question of moral turpitude to an attorney convicted  of felony traveling for the purpose of engaging in sex with a minor.

My view was that the crime inherently involved moral turpitude and that summary disbarment was required by statute and court decisions. 

That view was buttressed by this precedent, a case that I prosecuted.

Professor Alberto Bernabe agreed. 

In the Bewig case, the attorney was entitled to a hearing because the conviction was for a misdemeanor offense. The Court of Appeals had earlier decided that a misdemeanor could not involve moral turpitude per se in this en banc decision that I argued on behalf of the Office of Bar Counsel. 

In its finite wisdom, the Board here felt that this case merited a plenary proceeding before a hearing committee, with its review and then final action of the court. 

A huge waste of resources bestowed upon someone serving a fifteen year prison sentence.

The reason

A Philadelphia lawyer has been jailed for making a 12-year-old boy from the famed Bolshoi Ballet Academy his sex slave for six years. 

What update is there on the status of the matter after the passage of two years?

None.

How difficult is the analysis of the facts establishing moral turpitude?

Not very.

Welcome to the D.C. bar disciplinary system.  (Mike Frisch)