Iowa Recognizes Right To Keep Appointed Counsel

The Iowa Supreme Court has reversed an order disqualifying attorneys from the Des Moines adult public defender office in a murder case because other attorneys in the office had previously represented witnesses in the case.

The district court appointed two attorneys from the Des Moines adult public defender’s office to represent the defendant on a murder charge. After reviewing the State’s list of expected witnesses, the two defense attorneys realized other attorney colleagues in their office had previously represented three of the State’s witnesses on unrelated matters. The attorneys brought this potential conflict of interest to the district court’s attention and requested a ruling whether a conflict of interest precludes them from representing the defendant. After the hearing, the district court concluded a conflict existed and disqualified all attorneys employed at the Des Moines adult public defender’s office. Upon review, we conclude the potential conflict of interest shown under the circumstances presented in this record did not justify disqualification of the attorneys. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The court

The parties are not directly adverse on the disqualification issue. McKinley urges reversal of the disqualification order, reinstatement of Larson and Lauber as defense counsel, and remand for trial. The State, couching its position in furtherance of promoting error-free trials and protecting the finality of convictions, agrees the district court may have erred—but not because the district court found Larson and Lauber were burdened by a conflict of interest. Rather, the State expresses concern that if McKinley is convicted, the verdict might be overturned on appeal because the district court accepted the county attorney’s suggestion to override McKinley’s choice of counsel.

Importantly, the court recognized a right to keep appointed counsel

a right to choose one’s appointed counsel is different from “a right to choose to continue an ongoing attorney-client relationship.”

We…hold that once an attorney is appointed, they should not be removed “absent a factual and legal basis to terminate that appointment.” Harlan, 54 P.3d at 878. Trust and good communication are crucial features of an attorney–client relationship. This is true when a client has resources and privately retains a lawyer; and it is no less true when a client is indigent and obtains counsel appointed by the court. In both instances, opportunities for establishing trust and effective communication are generally enhanced over time through interpersonal contact. Once established, the interest in maintaining a relationship of trust with counsel is of no less importance to an indigent client than to one with ample resources to hire counsel.

The court concluded that there was no danger that the confidences of the witness/former clients would be endangered.

 Under the relevant caselaw and our rules of professional conduct, the prior representations of witnesses in unrelated matters by other members of the public defender’s office did not present an actual conflict or a serious potential for conflict that justifies the order disqualifying Larson and Lauber and countermanding McKinley’s interest in continuing an attorney–client relationship.

Justice Waterman concurred specially and would not apply imputed disqualification principles to public defender offices.

 I write separately because the majority misses the opportunity to settle the recurring legal issue: whether an individual public defender’s conflict of interest is automatically imputed to the entire public defender’s office. The answer to that question should be “no.”

It is disappointing the majority today fails to take the opportunity to settle this recurring legal question. Until the automatic-imputation issue is resolved by court decision or rule amendment, our trial courts will continue to struggle case-by-case with public defender intraoffice conflicts. Sadly, unnecessary disqualifications will continue. The practical consequences often will be increased taxpayer expense and defendants who proceed with substitute counsel instead of counsel of their choice.

 Justice Mansfield agrees with Justice Waterman. (Mike Frisch)