Unjust To Disbar?

Reciprocal (but not identical) discipline was imposed by the New York Appellate Division for the Second Judicial Department based on an attorney’s 2012 disbarment in New Jersey.

The court ordered a two-year suspension

 the Special Referee submitted a report in which he found that the respondent had sustained his burden of proving that the imposition of reciprocal disbarment by this Court would be unjust. The Grievance Committee now moves to disaffirm the report of the Special Referee. The respondent cross-moves to confirm the Special Referee’s report. In his report, the Special Referee concluded that the respondent understood the basis for his disbarment in New Jersey to be the misappropriation of funds in connection with a single real estate transaction, which occurred in or about 2007. The Special Referee recited the positive testimony about, and characterizations of, the respondent’s reputation for honesty and integrity from his witnesses and character references, many of whom were members of the judiciary. Moreover, he credited the respondent with “profound remorse” and “full acceptance of responsibility” for his misconduct. Under the extraordinary circumstances of this case, including, but not limited to, the single complaint of misappropriation in New Jersey; the absence of formal charges against the respondent; the respondent’s “profound remorse” and “full acceptance of responsibility” for his misconduct; his impressive character witnesses, including five current members, and one retired member, of the bench, members of the Bar, and a client; his excellent reputation as a member of the criminal law bar; his outstanding service to the community; and his commitment to representing the indigent, we find that the respondent has established by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the imposition of reciprocal disbarment would be unjust. However, we find that the respondent’s admitted misappropriation of client funds in the approximate amount of $3,800, for which we find no evidence of restitution, warrants his suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years.

Just one misappropriation.

As to the “absence of formal charges,” that was because he consented to disbarment. 

Frankly, it is difficult for me to see an injustice in holding someone who consented to disbarment in one jurisdiction to that concession in another state. (Mike Frisch)