Unanswered Questions Prevent Reinstatement Of Former Judge
A reinstatement petition filed on behalf of a judge who was removed from office and disbarred in Michigan failed to persuade the California State Bar Court Review Department, which has denied the request.
The basis for disbarment
Jenkins was licensed to practice law in Michigan in 1979. In 1983, at the age of 30, he was appointed as a judge of the District Court in Detroit. After his appointment, he engaged in a course of misconduct that included accepting bribes to dismiss traffic citations; misstating his address to reduce his insurance premium; soliciting an individual to commit perjury in a federal investigation of Jenkins’ misconduct; engaging in improper ex parte communications with parties and counsel regarding matters before him; improperly accepting gifts and favors from litigants and counsel who appeared before him; and signing a writ of habeas corpus to release an individual whom he knew personally without adequate information to justify the release.
In 1988, Jenkins was indicted in federal court for bribery, racketeering, mail fraud, extortion, and conspiracy, but he was ultimately acquitted.
The acquittal did not prevent his removal and disbarment.
The present issue
The hearing judge below denied Jenkins’ petition, having concluded that he failed to establish his rehabilitation from his past misconduct or that he presently possesses the necessary moral qualifications for reinstatement. The judge reached this conclusion based on Jenkins’ recent misconduct, including, inter alia, his failure to disclose material information in his reinstatement petition and in divorce papers he filed in the superior court, his affirmative misrepresentations in two apartment rental applications, and his recent conviction for reckless driving involving alcohol…
When we last considered Jenkins’ petition for reinstatement, we found that the record raised too many unanswered questions about his understanding of his professional and ethical obligations. The present record raises many of the same questions, which unfortunately remain unanswered. We thus conclude that Jenkins still has not established the requisite rehabilitation and moral fitness to resume the practice of law.
(Mike Frisch)