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Judge Sanctioned For Conflicts With Appointed Counsel

A decision from the Ohio Supreme Court is summarized by Chris Davey on the court’s web page:

Gallia  County Common Pleas Court Judge David Dean Evans has received a one-year stayed  suspension from the Ohio Supreme Court for failing to disqualify himself from a case in which he had a conflict  with defense counsel.

In a  5-2 per curium decision (not authored by any particular justice) announced  today, the court rejected the sanction of a six-month stayed suspension that  has been recommended by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline  and instead imposed a full year stayed suspensions.

Robert W. Bright practiced before Judge Evans  representing indigent criminal defendants for the Gallia County public-defender  commission. In the case that resulted in this disciplinary complaint, Bright  represented a defendant who had initially agreed to enter into a plea agreement  but later changed his mind during the plea hearing before Judge Evans. Moments  later, the defendant changed his mind again, and Judge Evans refused to accept  the plea. Three days later, Judge Evans again refused to accept the plea  agreement even though Bright and the county prosecutor jointly agreed to it.
      Bright then filed an 18-page motion  requesting that Judge Evans accept the plea agreement and stating that the  judge’s refusal to do so was “an abuse of discretion” and “unreasonable and/or  arbitrary and/or unconscionable.” Bright also criticized some of Judge Evans’s  other courtroom practices.

Judge Evans issued an entry overruling  Bright’s motion and removing Bright as counsel in the matter. The entry stated  in part:

The Court finds that while Defense Counsel’s attitude  toward the Court as expressed in the instant motion may not rise to the level  of Professional Misconduct or to the level of being contemptuous, it certainly  is not acceptable behavior. By such conduct he has created conflict with the  Court whereby in this case or for that matter any other case in the future,  when he does not agree with a decision or ruling by the Court, instead of being  critical by accusation of being arbitrary, unreasonable, unconscionable or of  abusing discretion, he simply may accuse the court of being bias [sic] or  prejudice [sic] as it relates to him. The Court must not only avoid any  impropriety, bias or prejudice but must avoid any appearance of such. The  expressions and attitudes of Defense Counsel as exhibited and announced in the  instant motion toward this Court compromises [sic] the Court’s ability to avoid  any appearance of bias [or] prejudice, or to be fair and impartial as it  relates to Defense Counsel regardless [of] how hard it tries or what strides it  makes toward guaranteeing that there would be no bias, prejudice and that it  would be fair and impartial.

Judge Evans subsequently filed entries  removing Bright as appointed counsel in 63 other criminal cases—even though  none of the defendants in any case had requested Bright’s removal as their  counsel. The entry in each case stated that “Attorney Robert W. Bright is  relieved of further obligation due to the conflict he has created with the  Court” and “due to the Court’s inquiry to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel,  Supreme Court of Ohio regarding Mr. Bright’s conduct.”
Judge Evans’s actions removed Bright’s entire  caseload, and within a month of the judge’s entries, the Gallia County public  defender terminated Bright’s employment, reasoning that it had “no other  options,” since Bright could not practice in Judge Evans’s courtroom. Disciplinary  counsel ultimately decided against filing any charges against Bright based on  Judge Evans’s grievance.
      The Ohio State Bar Association brought a  complaint against Judge Evans. The parties submitted a consent-to-discipline  agreement recommending that Judge Evans be publicly reprimanded. The Board of  Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline rejected the agreement and remanded  the matter for further proceedings before a three-member panel of the board. On  remand, the parties waived a hearing and submitted stipulations of fact and  misconduct and jointly recommended a stayed six-month suspension. The panel,  and later the board, adopted the parties’ stipulations and recommended  sanction. No objections were filed before the Supreme Court.  
      All parties agreed that Judge Evans’s conduct  violated Jud.Cond.R. 2.11 (requiring a judge to disqualify himself or herself  in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be  questioned, including circumstances in which a judge has a personal bias or  prejudice concerning a party or a party’s counsel) and Gov.Bar R. V(11)(E)  (requiring that all proceedings and documents relating to review and  investigation of grievances be private).

In today’s decision, the court wrote: “Given  the judge’s serious ethical violations and the significant harm caused by his  misconduct, we impose a fully stayed one-year suspension … Accordingly, Judge  David Dean Evans is hereby suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one  year, with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that he commit no  misconduct during the suspension. If Judge Evans fails to meet this condition,  the stay will be lifted and Judge Evans will serve the entire one-year  suspension. Costs are taxed to Judge Evans.”

Joining in the majority were Chief Justice  Maureen O’Connor and Justices Judith Ann Lanzinger, Sharon L. Kennedy, Judith  L. French, and William M. O’Neill.

Justice Paul E. Pfeifer wrote a dissenting  opinion in which he said that Judge Evans faces a particular set of challenges  as a judge in a smaller jurisdiction that should be taken into account in  setting the sanction in this case.

“When a judge in a large county has an  irreconcilable conflict with an attorney, that attorney’s cases can be assigned  to another judge. In smaller counties, especially those like Gallia County that  have only one judge in the general division of the court, that simple  resolution is not possible,” Justice Pfeifer wrote. “In the circumstances  before us, it is more sensible for the attorney to give way than the judge. Judge  Evans was elected by the people of Gallia County to serve as their sole judge;  however highly skilled, attorney Bright is an at-will employee. Surely, when an  irreconcilable conflict prevents them from working on cases, the elected judge  should supersede the at-will employee.” Justice Pfeifer said he would impose  the original sanction of a public reprimand that had been agreed to by the  parties.

Justice Terrence O’Donnell indicated that he  would impose the six-month stayed suspension that the parties agreed to after  the case was remanded.

The opinion is linked here. (Mike Frisch)