The Connecticut Appellate Court rejected an attorney’s challenge to a one-year suspension

On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court’s refusal to articulate and the Appellate Court’s refusal to order an articulation violate her due process rights, (2) the trial court incorrectly concluded that she engaged in misconduct sufficient to warrant any discipline, including suspension from the practice of law, and (3) the trial court incorrectly concluded that her claims of racial discrimination and retaliation were not properly raised in the presentment hearing.

As to the due process claim

On the basis of our review of the record and the briefs, and our consideration of the arguments of the parties, we conclude that the trial court’s memorandum of decision comprehensively sets forth the factual and legal bases for its conclusions. There was no ambiguity or deficiency in the memorandum of decision that would require the trial court’s articulation or prevent our review of the defendant’s claims on appeal.

As to the merits

With respect to the defendant’s remaining claims— that the trial court incorrectly concluded both that she engaged in misconduct and that her claims of racial discrimination and retaliation were not properly raised in the presentment hearing—on the basis of our examination of the record and the briefs, and our consideration of the arguments of the parties, we are persuaded that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. The issues were resolved properly in the trial court’s thorough and well reasoned memorandum of decision. See Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV-17-6022075-S (November 26, 2018) (reprinted at 335 Conn. , A.3d (2020))

The Superior Court decision is linked here.

One count involved a gift to the attorney that was deposited into an IOLTA account.

During her time as an attorney in Connecticut and while attending her church of choice, the respondent met and became friends with a woman by the name of Sharon Israel I Am, whom she described as her ‘‘church sister.’’ [Tr. 2 58:14–25, Miller]. They remained friends until approximately 2006 or 2007, when Ms. I Am moved out of state. In May, 2013, after having little or no contact between them in the intervening years, the respondent was contacted by Ms. I Am. [Tr. 2 59:7–10, Miller]. Pleased to have heard from her friend, the respondent agreed that the two should meet and they did so. During this meeting at the respondent’s office, Ms. I Am told the respondent that she had come into a large sum of money and wanted some advice on how best to handle it. [Tr. 2 59:14–19, Miller]. The respondent gave her advice in this respect and Ms. I Am offered her $5000 for the consultation, which the respondent at first  declined but later accepted at Ms. I Am’s insistence. [Tr. 2 60:7–17, Miller].

After the passage of a couple of weeks, Ms. I Am again contacted the respondent, saying she wanted to  renew their friendship and asked that they meet at a local hotel, which they did. This was followed by several social visits. At a visit on or about May 27, 2013, Ms. I Am told the respondent that she wanted to ‘‘bless’’ her by giving her a gift of $200,000 and gave her a check dated May 27, 2013, payable to her in that amount. [Tr. 2 62:10–23, Miller; Petitioner’s Ex. 5]. Ms. I Am placed no conditions or restrictions on the respondent’s usage of the gift. [Tr. 2 63:13–15, Miller]. Although the funds were not related to any specific professional work done by the respondent for Ms. I Am, the respondent wrote her own name onto the check and deposited the funds into her IOLTA account on May 28, 2013. [Tr. 2 65:12–18, Miller; Petitioner’s Ex. 5]. The respondent indicated her reason for placing the funds into the IOLTA account was that Ms. I Am was an ‘‘odd person.’’ In doing so, the respondent comingled the gift funds with $14,587.59 of her clients’ funds held in the IOLTA account.

The attorney tithed 10% to her church and then

In August, 2013, approximately three months after the respondent’s receipt of the gift, Ms. I Am contacted the respondent. In her conversation with the respondent, Ms. I Am asked her to quit the practice of law, as she felt it was inconsistent with their religious beliefs. When the respondent declined, Ms. I Am requested the return of the $200,000 gift. [Tr. 2 68:9–69:2, Miller]. The respondent explained that she had made the donations to the church but that she would return the remaining $180,000 which she still held. On August 12, 2013, the respondent wrote a third check from her IOLTA account, #1134, made payable to Sharon Israel I Am in the amount of $180,000. [Petitioner’s Ex. 5].

In two other matters

Her multiple failures to appear for scheduled court matters in both the Stone and Meszaros matters reveal a pattern of both negligence and intentional avoidance of such matters, often to the detriment of her clients. In Stone, status conferences had to be rescheduled numerous times. The defendant was prevented from taking the deposition of the plaintiff because the respondent cancelled scheduled dates on very short notice, causing inconvenience to opposing counsel and parties. In Meszaros, the respondent waited until literally the next to last day before filing the motion to open dismissal. Even accounting for the respondent’s credible testimony that the delay was partly due to the respondent seeking to obtain other counsel for her client, the court can make a reasonable inference from the facts above that the respondent’s workload, regardless of its size, exceeded her capacity to timely attend court appearances. This led to multiple dismissals of her clients’ cases.

There was also a finding of unauthorized practice while suspended.

Affirmative defenses

The respondent has raised two amended affirmative defenses to the allegations of the amended presentment complaint. Specifically, the respondent contends that the recommendations of the petitioner and/or the decisions of the SGC were based upon both racially discriminatory and retaliatory reasons in violation of the respondent’s constitutional rights under the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, § 20, of the Connecticut constitution.

…the defenses raised by the respondent are not properly before the court in this proceeding and, further, would fail even if they were properly before the court because she has failed to meet her burden of proof in this regard.

Sanction

The respondent’s actions have resulted in injury to the legal profession through her disrespect for judicial authority and her unwillingness to abide by specific court orders.
Also, despite having had the opportunity since near the end of 2015 to lift the Appellate Court suspension, there was no evidence presented that she has attempted to take any of the steps outlined by that court to do so.