It’s Not OK Just Because It’s Adultery
Rejecting a referee’s proposed three-month suspension, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ordered a two-year suspension of an attorney
Attorney Ritland has held a Wisconsin law license since 1978, and has an otherwise clean disciplinary history. The wrongdoing involved in this case centered on his sexual misconduct with two women: Z.H. and M.F.
In 2013, Attorney Ritland met Z.H. while in the checkout line at a Walmart. After Z.H. exited the store, Attorney Ritland invited her into his car, gave her his business card for his law office, and told her to contact him if she needed help or money. Several months later, Z.H. called Attorney Ritland, and he invited her to come to his law office after regular business hours. Upon luring Z.H. to his office and isolating her as he was the only one present, he gave her $40, touched her breasts outside of her clothing, and received oral sex from her. On another occasion, Z.H. again called Attorney Ritland and went to his office. He gave her $40, after which she displayed her breasts and then left, promising to return to complete the sexual encounter. Subsequent to these two incidents, Attorney Ritland visited Z.H. in jail, at a time when she was represented by a different attorney. Attorney Ritland informed jail personnel that he was visiting Z.H. as her attorney.
M.F. was a client in criminal matters
Attorney Ritland ceased representing M.F. in February 2015, after the district attorney warned him that he may have a conflict of interest in continuing to represent her given that his personal checkbook was found amongst items believed to be stolen by M.F.
Attorney Ritland admitted at his deposition in this matter that after he withdrew from representing M.F., he had sexual contact with her at his office on a number of occasions. The sexual contact included Attorney Ritland touching M.F.’s breasts, and, in one instance, M.F. performing oral sex on him.
In the criminal case brought against him, the attorney pled guilty to two counts of attempted adultery and a count of disorderly conduct.
Here, the court rejected the suggestion that the ABA has blessed adultery
We are also unpersuaded by Attorney Ritland’s argument that there is no factual connection between his convictions for attempted adultery and disorderly conduct and his fitness to practice law. It is true, as Attorney Ritland points out in his briefs, that the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Comment [2] to ABA’s Model Rule 8.4, upon which SCR 20:8.4 was based, states:
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving “moral turpitude.” That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. (Emphasis added.)
Seizing on the highlighted language, Attorney Ritland argues that adultery necessarily is not an offense that reflects adversely on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law.
This argument ignores the record before us. While Attorney Ritland asks us to look the other way because, in his view, his conviction was for an offense that has no connection to his fitness to practice law, we refuse to ignore the overwhelming evidence that bears squarely on his fitness to practice law; namely, evidence that he engaged in coerced or quid pro quo sexual relationships with vulnerable women. Attorney Ritland used his standing as an attorney and his law office to lure, isolate, and access Z.H. and M.F….
Sanction
The disconnect between the above-cited authorities and Attorney Ritland’s and the referee’s recommendations——calling for a public reprimand or a three-month suspension——gives us pause. Both are wholly inadequate given the seriousness with which we view acts of attorney sexual misconduct and the egregious nature of Attorney Ritland’s behavior, which included, in the referee’s words, “preying on vulnerable people” with financial or substance abuse problems. At the risk of redundancy, we emphasize that sexual misconduct by attorneys, whether with clients or non-clients, is not taken lightly.
The court imposed full costs
Attorney Ritland fought tooth and nail to avoid discipline, deploying sometimes questionable litigation tactics.
…Attorney Ritland had every right to vigorously contest the misconduct charge against him. But SCR 22.24(1m) makes clear that when a lawyer ultimately found guilty of misconduct imposes costs on the disciplinary system, he or she must expect to pay them. Throughout this case, Attorney Ritland has proven to be a difficult litigant, prone to obstinate conduct and obfuscation. Such litigation practices come at a cost; Attorney Ritland will pay it in full…
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J. (dissenting). I dissent because the discipline imposed for sexual misconduct is not consistent with our past disciplinary decisions for lawyers who had no prior misconduct of any type.
I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent.
The New Jersey Supreme Court took a similar approach to the “adultery defense” in this 1992 case. (Mike Frisch)