Arkansas Reinstates Former Governor’s Son

The Arkansas Supreme Court has reinstated the suspended son of a former Governor who had been subject to an interim suspension after his arrest

Several reasons justify our lifting the interim suspension. We have grave concerns about uniformity of treatment. Compare this case with just one recent example. Another lawyer, Everett Martindale, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit mail fraud in the amount of more than $3.5 million. He admitted using his trust-fund account and making false claims involving clients. He was indicted and charged in 2019. Yet, his license was not suspended until December 1, 2022, months after his guilty plea.

Most importantly, this court prefers that the Committee and the Director provide an attorney with notice and a hearing before issuing any interim suspension. We recognize the current rules permitted the Committee’s action here. Ark. Sup. Ct. P. Regulating Prof’l Conduct § 16(A). And ex parte interim suspensions may be justified in other cases, particularly when the conduct arises from an attorney’s practice of law. But here, this was a rapid summary suspension for conduct unrelated to petitioner’s practice as a lawyer. “A lawyer’s right to practice his profession is a valuable privilege, conferred in the first instance by this court and not to be taken from him without notice and a hearing as provided by law.” Ex parte Burton, 237 Ark. 441, 445, 373 S.W.2d 409, 411 (1963).

In today’s world of instant communication and Zoom hearings, minimal notice and an opportunity to be heard imposes no real burdens. And this court and its committees must lead by example by having rules that provide ample procedural due process protections. The dissent cites multiple examples of recent interim suspensions without notice and hearings, which strengthens our resolve and point. This needs to end. This petitioner just happened to bring a writ seeking relief that brought the issue to the Court’s full attention.

But to be clear: this court does not condone petitioner’s alleged violation of the law; nor do we condone his past behavior that has subjected him to Committee discipline. We focus instead on the lack of uniform treatment and due process. The Committee may proceed, but we lift the interim suspension.

For the above reasons, we grant the writ, lift the suspension, and direct the Committee to revisit our rules and submit proposed revisions to this court that provide more due process protections.

Three justices dissented

Late at night with bloodshot eyes and smelling of intoxicants, the driver of a Maserati blew through the streets of Bentonville at seventy-one miles an hour with a bag of cocaine, a Glock 9mm handgun, and a female passenger. After the Maserati sped past the Benton County Sheriff’s Office, Deputy Sheriff Hunter Volner activated his cruiser’s siren and blue lights to initiate a traffic stop where the driver, attorney William Asa Hutchinson III, refused to submit to chemical testing. The deputy’s body camera captured the forty-five-minute traffic stop.

Notably, this is not Hutchinson’s first encounter of its kind. In fact, it’s not even the second, third, or fourth incident of similar misconduct. This is his fifth such soiree with law enforcement over seven years’ time. Hutchinson’s pattern of misconduct illustrates his flagrant disregard for the law and for his status as an officer of the court. Enough is enough.

The practice of law is not a right but a privilege.

The concern

By granting Hutchinson extraordinary relief and reinstating his law license, the court has completely disregarded a unanimous decision by a committee of attorneys and laypeople that was based on substantial proof of a pattern of criminal behavior by Hutchinson. As a majority of this court freely admits, the panel’s action was also fully authorized by and in compliance with our rules. Section 16 of the Procedures of the Arkansas Supreme Court Regulating Professional Conduct of Attorneys at Law was adopted in its current form by this court in 2002, and it has not materially changed since that time.

Notably

Hutchinson does not dispute that he has a history of arrests and convictions related to alcohol and controlled substances or that he has been formally charged with the new offenses. He instead argues that an interim suspension of his license was not justified because this conduct is “incidental” to the practice of law and does not rise to the level of a substantial risk of serious harm to the public.

I disagree. The Committee concluded that Hutchinson “poses a substantial threat of serious harm to the public and his clients, as a result of both his conduct on January 13, 2023, and his pattern of frequent, consistent conduct for years leading up to January 13, 2023.” Indeed, it is hard to fathom how a pattern of alcohol and illegal-substance abuse and disdain for abiding by the law does not constitute a substantial risk of serious harm. The Preamble to the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct explains that “[a] lawyer’s conduct should conform to the requirements of the law, both in professional service to the clients and in the lawyer’s business and personal affairs.” (Emphasis added). Further, “[a] lawyer owes a solemn duty to uphold the integrity and honor of his profession; to encourage respect for the law and for the courts; to act as a member of a learned profession; to conduct affairs so as to reflect credit on the legal profession; and to inspire the confidence, respect and trust of clients and the public.” Id. These words must have meaning, and yet, the court’s decision today throws cold water on them.

The dissent contends that interim suspension was “entirely authorized by the rules currently in place.”

KATV reported on the criminal charges

The former Arkansas governor’s 47-year-old son, who has been charged with multiple DWI offenses in recent years, faces even more serious charges now.

In addition to being charged with refusal to submit to chemical testing, violation of the omnibus DWI act, and possession of a controlled substance, William has been charged with simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms.

That last charge could mean that William spends up to 40 years or life in prison if convicted.

(Mike Frisch)