Seal Of Disapproval

The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a writ of mandamus

The plaintiff, Attorney Jon L. Schoenhorn, appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his action for a writ of mandamus ordering the defendant, Melodie Moss, the chief court reporter for the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, to produce certain transcripts that were sealed by another trial court in a separate proceeding involving different parties. The plaintiff claims that the trial court incorrectly determined that his action was nonjusticiable and, therefore, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over it. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The court

The plaintiff’s action is nonjusticiable because no relief can be granted to him by the trial court. The plaintiff sought an injunction by way of a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant to produce transcripts that were sealed by another trial court in a separate proceeding involving different parties. The plaintiff’s action is, therefore, a collateral attack on a sealing order imposed by a different court in a different action, which is not permissible.

The sealed proceeding is a family court matter

Furthermore, the present mandamus action, like the administrative appeal in Valvo, does not adequately protect the interests of all affected parties, such as the Dulos children, whose custody is the subject of the sealed transcripts.

Concurrence linked here

In the present case, the fatal defect in the plaintiff’s claim is not temporal in nature; his action for a writ of mandamus was not filed too early or too late to obtain practical relief. The defect has nothing to do with when the plaintiff’s action was filed. Nor is who filed the action the impediment to adjudication. To the contrary, the controversy seems to be very much alive, adverse, and contested: the plaintiff wants access to the sealed transcript and the defendant, Melodie Moss, the chief court reporter in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, refuses to release the transcript unless and until it
is unsealed. The problem, instead, is that our collateral attack doctrine holds that relief is available only in the case in which the sealing order was filed. The singular method and means by which relief must be sought (i.e., by filing a motion to intervene and open the family case to obtain an order vacating the sealing order) do not appear to me to affect the nature of the controversy between the parties. The problem seems not to involve either justiciability or jurisdiction but, instead, implicates the important prudential interests of maintaining ‘‘fairness to all interested parties, the orderly administration of justice, and [the] consistency and stability of judgments.’’ Footnote 8 of the majority opinion.

(Mike Frisch)