Pro Se Lawyer Is A Lawyer

The dismissal with prejudice of a civil case has been affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

This appeal asks us to consider whether pro se litigants who are also attorneys should be afforded liberal pleading construction and treated as proceeding without counsel under Circuit Rules 28-1(c) and 30-1.3. James Huffman, a practicing attorney, sued a municipal court judge, a prosecutor, and the City of St. Helens, Oregon in Columbia County Circuit Court. Huffman contends that, via an oral motion, he disqualified Judge Lindgren from hearing his client’s case; he alleges that she ignored this disqualification, held him in contempt, and imprisoned him for six hours. The defendants, collectively “the government,” removed to federal court. Huffman moved to remand to state court, claiming that, although his complaint referenced federal law, he did not intend to bring federal claims. The district court dismissed his case with prejudice, and adopted the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, which noted that Huffman was afforded a liberal pleading standard.

The court

Joining our sister circuits, we take the opportunity to clarify that attorneys representing themselves should not be afforded special consideration and do not fall into the category of those “proceeding without assistance of counsel.” Circuit Rule 28-1(c). We affirm the district court’s dismissal with prejudice.

Noting the weight of authority

We join this chorus. There is a good reason that we afford leeway to pro se parties, who appear without counsel and without the benefit of sophisticated representation: “Presumably unskilled in the law, the pro se litigant is far more prone to making errors in pleading than the person who benefits from the representation of counsel.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citation omitted). That logic does not apply to practicing attorneys, nor should the grace extend to them.

Turning to the merits, we construe Huffman’s pleadings without deference and conclude that his claims are deficient, and amendment would be futile. Huffman’s claims against the prosecutor and the City are cursory at best, and his appeal seems aimed entirely at Judge Lindgren.

And there

The bulk of Huffman’s appeal is targeted at Judge Lindgren, who held him in contempt, a function shielded by judicial immunity.

(Mike Frisch)