Recipocal Disbarment Imposed

The Minnesota Supreme Court has imposed reciprocal discipline of disbarment

Disbarment is appropriate reciprocal discipline where an attorney disobeyed many court orders, made misrepresentations to a tribunal, filed numerous frivolous motions and appeals, engaged in dishonest conduct, and was disbarred in another jurisdiction for that misconduct.

Disbarment had been ordered in Washington State

The misconduct did not involve his representation of clients but arose out of personal legal matters—his divorce and related property disputes. Id. Jensen has a considerable disciplinary history based on similar misconduct in representing clients, including a reprimand, an admonition, and an indefinite suspension.

Prior discipline in Minnesota

Jensen was admitted to practice law in Minnesota in May 1985. We publicly reprimanded him in 1991, In re Jensen (Jensen I), 468 N.W.2d 541, 546 (Minn. 1991); admonished him in 1995, Appeal of Admonition Regarding A.M.E. (Jensen II), 533 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Minn. 1995); and indefinitely suspended him for a minimum of 18 months in 1996. In re Jensen (Jensen III), 542 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Minn. 1996). His past misconduct included disobeying court orders and violating procedural rules of appeal, Jensen I, 468 N.W.2d at 544–45, as well as asserting frivolous claims, refusing to make court-ordered payments, and making misrepresentations to judicial officers. Jensen III, 542 N.W.2d at 634.

We reinstated Jensen to practice law in Minnesota in 1999. In re Jensen, 593 N.W.2d 240, 241 (Minn. 1999) (order). In 2003, Jensen was administratively suspended in Minnesota for nonpayment of annual registration fees. There is no evidence that he has represented any client as a Minnesota attorney since the 1996 suspension. In 2007, he moved to Washington state, where he was admitted to practice in 2008.

The misconduct involved in part interference with his wife’s efforts to sell real property which led to a “vexatious litigant” finding.

The court here rejected a variety of contentions with respect to the fairness of the Washington proceeding and sanction imposed there

Jensen argues that his obstructionist behavior during the divorce was acceptable because he “had every right to refuse to give away his property.” But crucially, attorneys have an ethical obligation to obey court orders. When Jensen disagreed with a trial court order, he was entitled to appeal—an option he exercised at great length. But once a court has adjudicated a dispute and appeals have been exhausted, attorneys are expected to abide by the result. Attorneys, as officers of the court, have special obligations to conduct themselves with candor before courts and obey court orders. Simply put, Jensen was required to obey court orders and willfully failed to do so.

Self representation

the fact that no client was harmed does not allow an attorney to escape discipline; even an attorney representing himself is capable of inflicting great harm on the legal profession and the broader public.

Appropriateness of the sanction

Not only is Jensen’s misconduct similar to these three cases, but his consistent disciplinary history and lack of remorse are problematic aggravating circumstances. We look to disciplinary history in part to determine whether the public is likely to be put at risk if an attorney is allowed to continue practicing law. See McCloud, 998 N.W.2d at 769. Our concern about the risk to the public is significantly greater “when the lawyer engages in the same type of misconduct for which he has been previously disciplined.” Id. And while “lack of remorse” should not aggravate discipline when the attorney is merely asserting a good-faith defense, that is not the case here. Jensen’s refusal to accept any responsibility for his actions—whether motivated by ignorance or malice—suggests that he would pose a risk to the public if allowed to practice law.

(Mike Frisch)