Law Firm Administrator Not An Agent For Service Of Process

The Utah Supreme Court reversed and remanded a Court of Appeals decision holding that a legal malpractice case had been properly served

Ron Griffin sued the law firm of Snow Christensen & Martineau (SCM or firm) for legal malpractice. On the last day for timely service of the complaint, Griffin’s process server tried to serve SCM. After unsuccessfully trying to serve SCM’s registered agent, the process server left a copy of the papers with Dawn Chapman, SCM’s administrator.

SCM moved to dismiss Griffin’s complaint on the basis that he failed to properly serve the firm under rule 4(d)(1)(E) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which ordinarily requires a plaintiff to serve a corporation by delivering a copy of the complaint to “an officer, a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or law to receive process.” The firm argued that Chapman was not one of the agents identified in the rule, and the district court agreed. In particular, the court determined that Chapman was not a managing or general agent of SCM because she did not exercise general power involving judgment and discretion in her administrative role.

Griffin sought review of the district court’s decision in the court of appeals. A divided court reversed. Relying on Beard v. White, Green & Addison Associates, Inc., 336 P.2d 125 (Utah 1959), and In re Schwenke, 2004 UT 17, 89 P.3d 117, the court held that Chapman was a managing or general agent of SCM because she was more than a “mere employee” and was “at least in some manner responsible for the firm’s affairs.” Griffin v. Snow Christensen & Martineau, 2023 UT App 88, ¶¶ 34–36, 536 P.3d 91 (cleaned up). The court of appeals further opined that it was “fair” under the circumstances to conclude that service on SCM was proper because Chapman “played an integrated role within” SCM and was “positioned to know what to do with the complaint.” Id. ¶ 36 (cleaned up).

SCM petitioned this court for certiorari review. We granted its request and now decide whether Chapman was a managing or general agent under rule 4(d)(1)(E). We conclude that she was not. To qualify as a managing or general agent for purposes of that rule, one must be a person exercising general power in the corporation involving the exercise of judgment and discretion. Because Chapman did not exercise such judgment and discretion in her role as an SCM administrator, SCM was not effectively served. We thus reverse the court of appeals’ decision and remand the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings.

Role of Administrator

As an administrator, Chapman “was not free to control SCM’s property, operations, business activities, office, or affairs on her own.” Rather, she was charged with implementing decisions that had already been made by the firm’s committees or other executives. For example, while she could make recommendations to the committee charged with making hiring and firing decisions for non-lawyer staff, she was not authorized to make those decisions independently. And Chapman could not sign checks for SCM, she could not sign contracts on SCM’s behalf without explicit direction and authorization to do so, and she did not have a firm credit card. Finally, Chapman was not experienced with legal
processes, and her “job responsibilities did not include law procedures, filing of documents with the court, or other court issues.”

No thank you for your (attempted) service

We further conclude that Chapman was not SCM’s managing or general agent. Although Chapman played an important role in the firm as an administrator, she did not have general power involving the exercise of judgment or discretion. Accordingly, SCM was not properly served. We therefore reverse the court of appeals’ decision and remand this case to it for further proceedings.

(Mike Frisch)