The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal  and grant of judgment to a host of defendant with admonitory language to the counsel who brought the appeal

We highlight this particular issue as a preserved, but foreclosed, argument because it calls to the forefront a defalcation present in this case that we have seen before with Parkins’ counsel. Not only is counsel responsible as a general matter for knowing binding precedent when briefing matters before this case, but named counsel, Patricia Logan Harrison, had a particular reason for knowing about our holding in Timpson: she was also named counsel in that case. Yet the opening brief in this case reiterates nearly the same argument she made in Timpson, relying on the same case, without acknowledging that we rejected this argument in Timpson and without caveating her argument as an attempt to preserve an issue that is nonetheless precluded by existing precedent. Instead, the brief presents it as an open question. Equally troubling, this is not the first case in which Harrison’s conclusory arguments on brief have failed to challenge the grounds on which the district court ruled against her clients, and thus have resulted in waiver of most if not all of an appeal. See Stogsdill v. S.C. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 22-1069, 202 WL 3845313, at *2 (4th Cir. June 6, 2023); Timpson, 31 F.4th at 256–57. Nor are we the only court to express concern about Harrison’s scattershot  approach to litigation and her persistence in pressing foreclosed and dubious arguments. Estate of Valentine ex rel. Grate v. South Carolina, C/A No. 3:18-00895-JFA, 2022 WL 943062, at *9–11 (D.S.C. Mar. 29, 2022) (sanctioning Harrison).

Though we have reservations about whether counsel’s conduct complies with her ethical duties when practicing before the Court, we have elected not to sua sponte refer counsel for potential disciplinary action at this time. See Fed. R. App. P. 46; Fourth Circuit Local Rule 46(g). But we hereby admonish Harrison that any future filings before the Court following this pattern may result in referral for disciplinary proceedings pursuant to Rule 46(b)–(c) and Local Rule 46(g). Her current method of representing her vulnerable clients does them a significant disservice.