“Criminally Corrupt Body”
In a case where a party’s former criminal defense attorney sought foreclosure on a promissory note for unpaid fees of $350,000, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the former client’s motion to recuse the Chancellor.
The claim of bias
The prose plaintiff promptly filed his motion to recuse the criminally corrupt body of Tom McFarland on the 1s[t] day of September 2022 which was his first day of office.
The prose plaintiff September lst, 2022, motion to recuse the criminally corrupt body of Tom McFarland was supported by factual allegations and exhibits, refer to the prose plaintiffs September 1st, 2022, motion to recuse the criminally corrupt body of Tom McFarland case No. 16794.
Chancellor Tom McFarland’s October 31st, 2022, order denying the prose plaintiff s motion to recuse does not deny that a blatantly clear and extremely deadly conflict of interest exist between the plaintiff and Tom McFarland but only stated that the prose plaintiff failed to adhere to the procedural requirements of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 1.01.
As of the filing date of the plaintiff’s brief defendant attorney James F. Logan Jr. has not filed a motion opposing the plaintiff’s motion to recuse, therefore accepting all allegations and exhibits listed in the plaintiff’s September 1st, 2022, motion to recuse the criminally corrupt body of Tom McFarland as true and correct.
Respectfully, the foregoing is insufficient.
The Tennessee Board of Professional Conduct had censured the attorney in 2013 for an attempt to foreclose on a client’s home.
Mr. Logan, on behalf of a Limited Partnership in which he and his client were principals, attempted to
foreclose on his client’s residence to recover monies the client owed to the Partnership. In so doing, Mr. Logan violated Rules 1.7 and 1.8 because his actions were adverse to the interests of his client. Additionally, Mr. Logan violated Rule 1.6 by discussing his client’s finances with his client’s ex-wife without his client’s consent.
Some of the history of the dealings between the parties is set out in this opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Clifford Houston is not unacquainted with law enforcement or criminal defense lawyers. His most recent round of trouble began in 2006, when Houston participated in a shoot-out that ended with the death of a sheriff’s deputy and his ride-along. Facing first-degree and felony murder charges, Houston obtained the services of an attorney, James F. Logan. To secure payment for Logan’s representation, Houston’s father executed a deed of trust on the family property, granting Logan an interest in the Houstons’ land. The first trial ended in a mistrial, the second in an acquittal. Houston was not as grateful as one might expect. He did not pay his fees. That prompted Logan to foreclose on part of the Houston property, making the attorney and client neighbors and making the client unhappy.
It was not long before Houston was back in jail, this time awaiting trial on a firearms offense. While in jail, Houston heard that Logan had visited his family’s property (now partly Logan’s property), and did not take it well. As overheard by an official from the Blount County Sheriff’s Office, Houston went into “a complete rage.” The official heard Houston say something about “killing them all.” Then, in a variation on Shakespeare’s often-misinterpreted dictum, he said: “When me and my brother get out, we’re going to go to that law firm and kill every last one of them.” The next day, Houston placed a phone call to his girlfriend, Pat Honeycutt. Here is part of what he said:
HOUSTON: I’ll kill that motherf[* * *]er [referring to Logan] when I get out. Hey, I ain’t kidding! I ain’t akidding! They can record it! They can do whatever the hell they want! That motherf[* * *]er opens up my house, I’ll kill his ass! When I get out of this motherf[* * *]er, he’s dead!
․HOUSTON: The only thing [Logan]’s gonna get from me is a f[* * *]ing bullet! That’s the only thing that son of a b[* * * *] gonna get from me! That’s the only damn thing! They better get somebody to lock that son of a b [* * * *] up! ‘Cause I’ve got something for Mr. damn Logan! You let me get out of this motherf[* * *]er in any shape, form, or fashion, and he’s got a damn problem!
․HOUSTON: You tell any of my family, you tell Cody, you tell Rachel, any of them, to kill that son of a b[* * * *]! ․ Any of my, any of my people has got my permission to kill that son of a b[* * * *]!
HONEYCUTT: They ain’t gonna do that. I mean, they ain’t gonna shoot nobody.
HOUSTON: Well, I ain’t got no damn problem with it. I ain’t got no damn problem with it.
Id. at 665-66 (internal citations omitted). Further, Houston told Honeycutt:
I want you to get in the news ․ I want people to know that son of a b [* * * *] don’t own nothin’. He ain’t sellin’ nothin’, and whoever buys it, they just throw’d their money in the damn wind! Because I’m comin’ home, and I’m goin’ to my property, and whoever’s there, they got a damn problem!
A few additional facts from the second trial are necessary to properly understand Houston’s claims in this appeal. First, the United States put on proof that Houston’s call to Honeycutt was routed from the jail where he was being held pre-trial to a computer server in Louisiana and then back to Tennessee as part of the jail’s contract for provision of telephone services to inmates; Houston was unaware that his calls to Honeycutt were routed out of the State of Tennessee. Second, stickers on the inmate telephones made clear that the calls could be recorded and that jail officers could listen in on inmates’ conversations.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the conviction for transmitting a threat to injure his attorney in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). (Mike Frisch)