Sanction Proposed For Lead Prosecutor In Chandra Levy Murder Trial

The District of Columbia Board on Professional Responsibility has issued its report and recommendation  on disciplinary charges brought against two prosecutors in the murder of Chandra Levy

Rule 3.8 of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct sets forth the “Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor.” Rule 3.8(e) provides, in pertinent part, that a prosecutor in a criminal case shall not “[i]ntentionally fail to disclose to the defense, upon request and at a time when use by the defense is reasonably feasible, any evidence or information that the prosecutor knows or reasonably should know tends to negate the guilt of the accused or to mitigate the offense . . . .” As the Board has stated:

[A] violation of Rule 3.8(e) undermines our entire system of criminal justice. Prosecutors are not merely advocates; they are called upon to make sure that criminal trials are fair to the accused and that the machinery of prosecution is credible. At its most severe, a violation of Rule 3.8(e) can mean that an innocent person languishes in prison . . . . In re Dobbie, Board Docket No. 19-BD-018, at 37-38 (BPR Jan. 13, 2021).

Respondents Haines and Campoamor-Sanchez are charged with the failure to timely disclose exculpatory evidence to defense counsel, in violation of Rule 3.8(e); for this same alleged misconduct, both are also charged with engaging in conduct that seriously interferes with the administration of justice, in violation of Rule 8.4(d). Respondent Haines is also charged with knowingly disclosing confidential government information, in violation of Rule 1.6(a).

We find that Disciplinary Counsel proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent Haines violated Rules 1.6(a), 3.8(e), and 8.4(d), and we recommend that she be suspended for sixty days. For the reasons discussed herein, we dismiss all charges against Respondent Campoamor-Sanchez.

The accused

Respondents Amanda Haines and Fernando Campoamor-Sanchez were Assistant United States Attorneys responsible for prosecuting Ingmar Guandique for the murder of a congressional intern, Chandra Levy, who had disappeared in 2001 and whose remains were found in Rock Creek Park a year later. FF 1-4.2 The trial of Ingmar Guandique took place in October and November 2010. Jt. Stip. 6-8.3 At that time, Respondent Haines, who began working as an Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia in 1998, was a seasoned trial lawyer. Beginning in about 2007 she began working primarily on unsolved homicide cases involving female victims. FF 3. Respondent Campoamor-Sanchez joined the D.C. U.S. Attorney’s Office in 2004 and was assigned to its homicide section in September 2007.5 FF 4.

The issue

At the center of this disciplinary case is a three-page letter, dated February 23, 2009, that federal inmate Miguel Zaldivar had sent to law enforcement (the “Zaldivar letter”). FF 6-7. This letter detailed information about the Levy case provided to Zaldivar by another federal inmate, Armando Morales. Morales provided this information to Zaldivar for the specific purpose of inclusion in the letter to law enforcement. At the time this letter was written, Morales and Zaldivar were incarcerated in the same facility, and Morales considered Zaldivar to be his “mentor.” FF 7-8, 59. Morales ultimately served as a key prosecution witness in the trial of Ingmar Guandique for the murder of Chandra Levy. See, e.g., FF 49, 61, 65.

The first page of the Zaldivar letter provided background information about Armando Morales, including, among other things, that Morales: (i) had seen Levy’s case on CNN; (ii) knew who killed Chandra Levy; (iii) was a founder of the Fresno Bulldogs, a notorious gang closely associated with the “Mexican Mafia”; (iv) was a drop-out from the gang; (v) had “debriefed to law enforcement about his gang involvement”; and (vi) was willing to help law enforcement with the Levy case. FF 7; see also DCX 6 at 88.

The second and third pages of the Zaldivar letter contained text, written in the form of a narrative by Morales, in which Zaldivar “hope[d] . . . to capture the essence” of what Morales knew about the murder as Morales had told it to Zaldivar. DCX 5 at 49. The narrative recited that, while Ingmar Guandique and Morales shared a cell three years earlier in 2006, Guandique told Morales he had attacked Chandra Levy and was afraid he would be charged with her murder. Id. at 49-50

The full letter was disclosed to the grand jury. 

At trial, Morales offered a story that was contradicted by the first page of the letter

There is no dispute that Respondents did not disclose the Zaldivar letter to defense counsel prior to the start of trial. Pages two and three of the letter were produced mid-trial, as Jencks material, roughly two nights before Morales testified.13 FF 46. Although the issue was hotly contested by the parties, the Hearing Committee found that the first page of the Zaldivar letter – which, again, contained the statement that Morales had previously “debriefed to law enforcement” – was never produced to the defense before the end of the trial. See FF 37, 56.

In concluding that the first page of the Zaldivar letter was not ever disclosed to the defense, the Hearing Committee relied on its determination that both defense attorneys testified credibly – “clearly, unhesitatingly and from first-hand
knowledge,” “unshaken on cross-examination” – that the first page was never given to them. FF 47. The Hearing Committee found that defense counsel did not object to the missing first page of the letter because they “trusted that they were being given the Jencks that they were entitled to.” FF 50 (emphasis added).

In contrast, only one testifying witness for Respondents – Assistant U.S. Attorney Chris Kavanaugh – had any knowledge of the Jencks production. The Committee found that his testimony was “sincere” but “mistaken,” that his recollection was “hazy,” and that he played no substantive role in the production. FF 51-53. He could not say, with certainty, whether the first page was included in the production. FF 52. Although both Respondents testified that they thought the first page of the letter was contained in the packet, neither had any direct knowledge of that fact. FF 55. The Hearing Committee found that Respondent Haines had assumed responsibility for Morales as a witness at trial and was therefore responsible for the failure to produce the first page of the letter; the Committee also determined, however, that there was insufficient record evidence to establish that the omission of the first page from the Jencks production was intentional. 

The defendant was convicted of first degree murder.

When the full letter was discovered post-trial, he was granted a new trial and the government dismissed the case without prejudice.

The Board dismissed charges against the junior AUSA

This is a close call. On the one hand, there can be no question that Respondent Campoamor-Sanchez had an independent obligation to comply with Rule 3.8(e). On the other hand, Disciplinary Counsel has cited no authority for the proposition that each prosecutor assigned to a trial team must take it upon themselves to make independent Brady/Giglio disclosures as to witnesses no longer assigned to them, particularly when he or she has no knowledge of the content of the final disclosures. On these unique facts, therefore, we decline to read Rule 3.8(e) to impose such an obligation.

Respondent Haines

We agree with the Hearing Committee that the evidence of Morales’ debriefing to law enforcement tended to negate Guandique’s guilt. The mere fact of the prior debriefing, in of itself, would have challenged significantly – and very likely undermined – Morales’ credibility before a jury. Morales claimed that, prior to his participation in the prison skills program, he would not have been inclined to report Guandique’s confession to law enforcement because he had a different value system, did not trust the police, and had “never done that before . . . never done nothing like that.” The fact of Morales’ prior debriefing with law enforcement was materially inconsistent with these statements and with this story. Consequently, Respondent Haines should have disclosed this information as potentially exculpatory impeachment to defense counsel at least as of the date she sent the Giglio letter on October 4, 2010.

The Board, however, disagreed with the Hearing Committee’s finding that she knowingly failed to disclose exculpatory evidence.

Confidentiality violation

Respondent Haines acknowledges that she violated this Rule by forwarding internal prosecution emails containing confidential government information to her then-boyfriend, and she accepts responsibility for this Rule violation.

Sanction

We recognize that Respondent Haines served the public for many years as a prosecutor, including working to prosecute unsolved homicides on behalf of female victims. She has no prior discipline and we do not find that she engaged in dishonesty. Respondent Haines committed three disciplinary rule violations, but since the Rule 8.4(d) violation is based on the same conduct as the Rule 3.8(e) violation, we do not view it as an aggravating factor. And we depart from the Hearing Committee’s conclusion that she knowingly failed to disclose exculpatory evidence to defense counsel in this matter. Respondent Haines has also acknowledged her wrongful conduct in violating Rule 1.6.

On the other hand, Respondent Haines’ misconduct was grave. “A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence.” Rule 3.8(e), cmt. [1]. By withholding crucial evidence, albeit based upon a mistaken and unreasonable understanding of that evidence, she failed to uphold her duties. Her inactions set in motion a cascade of events that underscore the importance of deterring such misconduct. And we find, as the Hearing Committee did, that her failure to abide by the Court’s clear instructions in Zanders is a factor in aggravation.

In consideration of the foregoing, we find that a suspension of sixty days is a sanction sufficient to protect the public and the courts, maintain the integrity of the legal profession, and deter the respondent and other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct.

Board member Robert Walker authored the unanimous opinion. (Mike Frisch)