When The Lawyer Represents Himself

The Connecticut Appellate Court has imposed reciprocal discipline for sanctions imposed in Maine, rejecting a host of contentions

Even if we deem his claim preserved, however, much of the veritable laundry list of constitutional arguments and alleged violations of rights, including fleeting references to the ninth amendment, the supremacy clause, the commerce clause, and the full faith and credit clause of the United States constitution, consists of no more than generalized statements of legal propositions, devoid of any cogent analysis or application of the facts to any of the asserted constitutional doctrines relative to the subject matter at hand: the reciprocal enforcement of rules governing attorney professional conduct. Having thoroughly reviewed the record and the briefs, we are unpersuaded that the court’s finding that the respondent failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence a cognizable defense to the Maine disciplinary proceedings was clearly erroneous.

The court also holds that a self-representing attorney has the same ethical obligations as one representing a client

Our statements in Egbarin and In the Matter of Presnick recognize that an attorney always must conduct himself or herself in accordance with professional standards and belie the respondent’s arguments that seek to differentiate for disciplinary and constitutional purposes between an attorney’s actions taken on behalf of a client and actions taken in representing himself in his role as a citizen…

Our conclusion that the respondent had the same professional obligation to the court when representing himself as when representing a client undermines the central construct in his first amendment challenge to the imposition of reciprocal discipline on him in this case. He advances no factual or legal basis for reaching any other conclusion. To avoid reciprocal discipline, it is the respondent who has the burden to demonstrate the validity of some defense; it is not the duty of the court or bar counsel to negate every posited defense. His arguments on appeal unquestionably fall short of convincing us that the trial court’s finding that he failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence a defense premised on a violation of first amendment rights was clearly erroneous.

The sanction is a one-year suspension. (Mike Frisch).